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In Search of Mythology: Introduction 
The readings that we have collected together in this book demonstrate both the depth of 
tradition and the extent of recent innovation that exists within in the study of mythology. 
The academic exploration of mythology has been a cornerstone of a range of nested 
disciplines (aAnthropology, cClassics, lLiterary sStudies and rReligious sStudies) since their 
foundation. These disciplines continue to produce important reflections on (and analyses of) 
mythology. However, they have been joined in recent years by insightful work coming from 
the newer disciplines of cCultural sStudies and mMedia sStudies. Despite the centrality of 
mythology to all these disciplines, the study of mythology remains divisive, with little 
agreement about either the substance of mythology or its function. In this book we aim to 
introduce the reader to these lively, interdisciplinary, debates, and we have deliberately 
chosen to showcase a range of established and emerging voices. It is hoped that through 
direct engagement with the full range of insight that these diverse thinkers represent the 
reader will be given a firm foundation for further exploration, reflection and analysis. 
Outline of the Bbook 
This Reader is organized thematically and follows the track for understanding mythology 
that we have found most successful as a way of introducing this material to undergraduate 
students. Therefore, while it is not necessary to follow the readings in the order that they 
are presented here, the Reader has been deliberately constructed to give the material a 
sense of development and flow. This book is organizsed into four main parts, which that 
cluster readings around the central questions of the origin, form, function and future of 
mythology. These, large, sections of the book are further divided into groups of three 
readings, which all cluster around a unifying topic (such as dreams, history, or place), often 
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providing competing approaches or /interpretations to a single issue. It is hoped that by 
placing these readings in conversation with each other, the book will provide a rich, 
textured, introduction to these topics. To help facilitate this, the Reader provides section 
introductions that frame the debate and link it to wider ideas or /issues that are found both 
elsewhere in the book and beyond its pages. It is, however, possible to either engage with 
the readings in isolation, or to profitably compare material across sections. To aid in these 
processes, we have both provided both a brief introductory note to each individual reading 
and (in this general introduction) an outline of the overall themes, topics and concerns of 
this Reader. 
The first part of the Reader explores the important area of definitions. As such, it 
flows naturally on from this introduction’s attempt to locate mythology, as well as both 
clearing the way for the subsequent sections and consolidating an understanding of the 
difference between an academic approach to mythology and popular conceptions. The first 
chapter in this section contains a sample of Littleton’s (now- classic) classification of myth, 
legend, and folklore. This chapter is followed by Ben-Amos’s essay ‘The Idea of Folklore’, 
which calls into question the distinctions made in the previous chapter and provides an 
important alternative source of definitions for students to engage with. The final chapter, of 
this first section, is Malinowski’s often- parodied definition of myth, which takes the 
discussion in a radically different direction and raises the important question of the 
relationship between myth and society. This Rreading is far richer than textbook summaries 
would allow and provides a good foundation for the later sections of this Rreader. The first 
section therefore begins with classic distinctions, and ends with questions that will help 
students think critically about the readings that follow. 
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The second part of the Reader groups together theorists who try to locate an origin 
for myth that, in part, explains the apparent similarity of geographically and temporally 
distant material. The first section of this part explores theories that either find the origin of 
the myths’ repeating patterns in sacred actions, sacralizsed profane action, or some 
combination of the two. It presents selections from the classic, global theories of myth that 
are found in the writings of James Frazer, Otto Rank and (in a rather different form) Joseph 
Campbell. Here the two heroe’s’ journeys unite with the sacrificial priest to initiate the 
reader into the cultic milieu of universalist thought. Section B, of part 2two, moves to 
explore further the way that myth bridges inner and outer worlds, collective experience and 
individual psyche, through a focus on the relation between myth and dreams. Jung’s 
contribution on UFOs retains its relevance, despite its age, and this pairs well with Sepie’s 
article, which both demonstrates the truly excellent material that is being currently 
produced at the cutting edge of mythography and interrogates many of the core conceits of 
the earlier material. The second part ends with a section that explores theorists who either 
see history as the seed of myth or see its antithesis. These include, Mircea Eliade, Max 
Müller, and Nicholas Allen. The arguments presented here centre around broader issues of 
truth and falsehood, myth, identity and cultural heritage and are of the utmost relevance to 
today’s students despite the apparent generation gap. 
The third part of the book switches the debate to explore structuralist, 
Neostructuralist and those spatial theories that are largely built upon the former work. It 
opens with an important and concise demonstration of the structuralist technique by Lévi-
Strauss and an example of how it may be adopted to engage with functionalist and Freudian 
theories by Edmund Leach, before the section is rounded out with a wonderfully concise 
summary, by Aguirre of Proppian Structuralism. The second sSection B of this part 
complicates the Straussian approach further; Stephen Hugh-Jones develops significantly the 
concepts of implicit mythology, the relevance of ritual to structuralism and the importance 
of participant observation for structuralist analysis. Mary Douglas’s essay questions Lévi-
Strauss’s approach, while also pointing out some of its more positive aspects. Finally, the 
work that we have selected by Seth Kunin operates to both integrate the material that 
surrounds it and clearly outline the scope and process of the Neostructuralist project. 
The last section of part 3 three focuses on the often-overlooked spatial theories of 
myth, starting with Frances Harwood’s detailed exploration of the spatial elements of myth 
in the Trobriands, which also serves to return us to Malinowski. The next reading presents 
Jonathan Miles-Watson’s spatial analysis of Himalayan mythology as a way of 
demonstrating how Léevi-Strauss’s theory of implicit mythology can be used to build a 
powerful technique for the analysis of postcolonial, urban, societies. The section ends with 
Miriam Khan’s work on the importance of paying attention to stones for the interpretation 
of mythology in Papua New Guinea. Collectively, these works develop the nascent spatial 
elements of the previous contributions and explore the importance of myth for 
understanding how we make ourselves at home in the world. 
The fourth and final part of the reader asks the important question of where myths 
are going. The first section focuses on myths and popular culture, and helps demonstrate 
how myth is used, as well as how mythography can be applied, to familiar aspects of the 
modern world. In this section we explore the relation of mythology (and myth analysis) to 
Disney princesses (Dundes et al.), sScience fFiction (Suttons) and fFan fFiction (Willes). The 
last section of the reader gives the editors the opportunity to outline their understanding on 
the future of mythology before concluding with Robert Segal’s highly informed exploration 
of the likely outcome for the future of mythology, which is based upon the theoretical 
presuppositions of several of the key thinkers that are found in earlier sections of this work. 
This final section therefore returns us back to the core themes that began (and run 
throughout) this book –; themes that are built upon the tensions that bind together wildly 
different understandings of mythology’s form, function and veracity. 
Myth and truth? 
The problems surrounding the general interpretation of myth are encapsulated by the way, 
at a recent Sociology conference, a highly respected (and well-known) academic casually 
defined myth as any widely held delusional belief. This definition has the merit of being 
relatively open -ended; however, this Western, common sense, understanding of mythology 
runs counter to many academic definitions and is a highly problematic approach to the 
term. It is, nevertheless, part of a persistent tradition of ethnocentric classificatory systems, 
which famously found articulation in the writings of Tylor (1871: 286–287) and can still be 
found in 21st twenty-first-century academic explorations of myth (cf Cunliffe 2001: 7). 
Tylor’s approach to myth was a reaction against the trend of his time, which was to view 
myths as primarily relating events that are intended to be allegorical (Segal 1999: 10). He 
was therefore keen to argue that for certain people, myths were as real as science was for 
his audience. He suggested that myth is, in fact, a kind of precursor to science, a sort of 
imperfect logic, which seeks to explain events that occur in the physical world (Tylor 1871: 
286–287). The Tylorian definition of myth, as a faulty form of science, slides easily into the 
colloquial understanding of myth as falsehood, and both are problematic because of their 
ethnocentric assumption of a qualitative difference between the interpreter and the 
interpretation, which in turn creates a category of human (the native and/or the child) 
whose engagement with the world is somehow lacking. 
The understanding that mythology is other people’s science is regularly bound up 
with the suggestion of it as other people’s history. By which, it is usually implied that myth is 
a more limited way of understanding the past than history. It is common to find newspaper 
articles, shows and conversations that revolve around discovering if a well-known event 
actually occurred in history, if it is merely myth, or some combination of the two. This 
approach is, in turn, tied to the appealing, if limiting, suggestion that myth may lead us 
towards true historical discoveries. A good example of this is the now- notorious, yet widely 
digested television shows and publications of Graham Hancock (see, for example, Hancock 
2012). 
In the academic arena, the relationship between myth and history has tended to be 
more carefully considered than in the popularist material discussed above, although it is 
possible to find the crude myth/history division of popular speech in academic publications, 
with myth and history positioned as two distinct, sometimes opposed, sometimes 
overlapping categories. We see this in the phenomenological thought of Eliade, who brings 
the categories of myth and history into his famous a sacred/profane opposition (cf Eliade, 
Part 2two, Section B, Chapter 1). For Eliade, myth ‘narrates a sacred history, an event that 
took place in primordial time … [Iit contains] Supernatural Beings who do not belong to the 
everyday world … [and] is always an account of creation of one sort or another’ (1963: 5–6). 
Encapsulated in this sentence is Eliade’s concept of (and subsequent approach to) myth, 
which is opposed to more lineal, profane, views of history. This idea of myth as a sacred and 
participative act of collective remembrance has resonances with Léevi-Strauss’ 
understanding of Amazonian myth’s ability to ameliorate the traumas of history through an 
emphasis on continuity (Lévi-Strauss and Charbonnier 1969: 33–39). In contrast, Western 
mythology (read history) celebrates historical rupture as a series of linear steps in a process 
of cultural evolution (cf Lévi-Strauss, Part 3three, Section A, Chapter 1 and Hugh-Jones, Part 
3three, Section B, Chapter 2). 
An alternative approach has been taken by a number of comparative 
mMythographers (Muller 1897,; Dumézil 1988,; MacCana 1997,; et al.), who have viewed 
recorded mythology as source material in the quest to recover a forgotten history. In the 
famous Indo-European approach, extant mythology from across India and Europe is 
employed as a gateway to understanding, or (re)constructing, the now- lost culture of a 
postulated ancient race (known as the Aryans). The existence of a single proto Indo-
European culture is far from certain and based primarily on linguistic similarities that spread 
throughout India and Europe, which can be taken as a purely linguistic relationship (cf Allen, 
Part 2two, Section C, Chapter 3), but can also be viewed as the result of a historical 
relationship. From here, it is but a small step to the suggestion that just as traces of Aryan 
language survive in modern languages, then so too traces of their mythology survives in 
modern myth and ritual (cf Muller, Part 2two, Section C, Chapter 1). Scanning through 
mythology, across huge expanses of space and time, these mythographers were able to find 
affinities in the material (sometimes with the benefit of considerable reinterpretation of the 
source material). However, there are significant problems with this fundamental model, 
foremost of which is, that with a data pool so large and a little ingenuity, it is possible to find 
any pattern desired if you look hard enough. More worryingly, the preoccupation with 
reconstructing a system of a hypothetical lost people, at times, blinds these analysts to a 
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subtle understanding of the mythology’s host culture. While in its later incarnations, the 
comparative approach is made into a strength, in the vast majority of Indo-European 
analyses, it is a clear weakness. 
For all its ingenuity, Frazer’s understanding of myth (cf Frazer, Part 2two, Section A, 
Chapter 1), as a form of ritual explanation, is liable to the same ‘’cherry- picking’ allegations 
as Muller. Indeed, Frazer’s attempt to solve the mystery of the murder of the priest at Lake 
Nemi, prompts him to him range freely through space and time, in an effort to reconstruct a 
lost central pattern of purportedly (almost) universal significance. Similarly, Campbell’s 
suggestion that myth speaks to a universal pattern of loss, gain and return, rests on a 
reductionist technique (cf Campbell, Part 2two, Section A, Chapter 3). For Campbell, myth is 
a metaphorical/poetical insight into the penultimate truth (Campbell & and Moyers 2011). 
This is an extreme version of the classical psychiatric approach to mythology that sees it as a 
reflection of inner processes (cf Jung, Part 2two, Section B, Chapter 1 and Dundes, Part 
two2, Section B, Chapter 2). This argument is based upon the belief that myth is a form of 
psychological therapy, which allows for the public outworking of universal, personal, 
psychological problems. This notion is encapsulated by Jung in the Psychology of Child 
Archetype, where he writes that ‘myths are original revelations of the preconscious psyche, 
involuntary statements about unconscious psychic happenings, and anything but allegories 
of physical processes’ (2002: 87). Jung here implies that both Tylor’s and Frazer’s analyses 
techniques have made the mistake of taking the content of myth far too literally and have 
entirely missed the ability of myth to be a symbolic expression of the preconscious. 
This definition of myth is seemingly more open -ended than Tylor’s definition, for, in 
this understanding, myth relates to a broader range of material (not simply nature), without 
the need for a violent reconstruction, such as that which Frazer and Muller imposes on the 
material. As Kunin (20032: 15), has pointed out, if the psychological approaches were 
content to suggest that myth is an outward expression of psychological issues, the model 
would be at least plausible; however, in stating that there is a common content of those 
unconscious, or preconscious issues, the approaches fall into the same trap of universalism 
that Frazer does. Indeed, we would want to push this concern even further than Kunin does 
to suggest that the Cartesian notion of inward and outward worlds, which lies behind the 
psychological model, is not only ethnocentric, it is but also inaccurate (see, for example, 
Ingold 2000: 157–172). 
Myth and society 
According to Malinowski, mMyth is tied more concretely back to the social societies that it is 
drawn from by Malinowski (Part 1one, Section A, Chapter 3). Malinowski shares Eliade’s 
notion that myth ‘is a narrative resurrection of a primeval reality, told in satisfaction of deep 
religious wants, [and] moral cravings’ (2003: 117). However, Malinowski then goes on to 
suggest that myth also fulfils several other roles, which become increasingly less familiar to 
Eliade’s definition. Malinowski ultimately ends with a statement that is more reminiscent of 
Tylor’s position: myth acts to enhance and codify ‘social submissions, assertions, [and] even 
practical requirements’ (2003ibid)’. Thus Malinowski’s definition of myth is quite open 
ended and allows myth a wide range of social functions. Crucially, myth for Malinowski is 
generally seen as performing a social function, and he therefore believes that myth is best 
viewed in its context. 
Malinowski’s imperative to contextualizse myth stands in contrast to the global 
comparative theories discussed above. For Malinowski, like Tylor, believes that myth is 
something which cannot be stripped away from its context and is best understand 
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understood by careful observation of how it is used. Furthermore, he discounts the notion 
of historical reconstruction of a myth’s use, let alone its content. In particular Malinowski 
develops his argument with regard to a Trobriand origin myth, which he claims must neither 
be interpreted neither as faulty history nor as symbolic expressions of deep psychological 
needs. Instead, Malinowski argues that ‘the personage and beings that we find in them [that 
is to say myths] are what they appear to be on the surface, and not symbols of hidden 
realities’ (2003: 184). 
Malinowski’s highlighting of the need for cultural contextualizsation of myth and the 
use of myth is vital if we are to understand what myths mean to anyone other than 
ourselves. However, in limiting myth to a surface- level interpretation, Malinowski seems to 
be swinging too far in the opposite direction. Indeed, it is hard to understand why 
Malinowski’s analysis precludes the existence of a more fundamental level of meaning. 
Malinowski, however, is useful for shifting the debate from what myth might be and 
towards a discussion of what myth might do; in so doing, he opens the possibility of myth 
operating at more fundamental levels, whilest remaining tied to the social contexts in which 
it arose. 
In Mary Douglas’s highly influential analysis of taboo in the Hebrew Bible (2003), she 
demonstrates powerfully both the categorizsing tendencies of humans and the way that 
myth reflects those structuring systems. It follows therefore that myth can be a gateway to 
an appreciation of these underlying categorizsing systems and as such the key to helping us 
understand how various societies carve up the world. This idea comes through strongly in 
the work of Lévi-Strauss (Part 3three, Section A, Chapter 1), which was to completely 
revolutionizse the field of mythography. Lévi-Strauss’s technique operates on the 
assumption that myth raises problems, or contradictions, that are inherent in the world and 
works towards their resolution. Myth, however, neither raises these problems neither in a 
literal way (as the functionalists claim,) nor in a socially unmoored way (as psychoanalysts 
would have), but through a series of (often- dialectical) relations (Lévi-Strauss 1955). Myth, 
for Lévi-Strauss, is therefore something that must both be interpreted both symbolically and 
contextually. 
It is important to stress that for Lévi-Strauss elements in one mythic system that 
seem to resemble another are no more necessarily related than words in different 
languages that seem to resemble each other (ibid). Therefore, the Indo-Europeanists were 
right to build on a linguistic analogy;, however, they erred in not applying to myth the 
linguistic principle that what matters is the similarity in relation between words, not the 
words themselves (cf De Saussure 2011). Similarly, it is the relations between elements of 
myth (called mythemes) that reveal the underlying classificatory systems of the culture and 
unlock the keys to understanding both cultural systems and (at a more profound level) the 
human condition (Lévi-Strauss 1955). 
Leévi-Straus’s work on mythology is extensive and developed over a protracted 
period. It is therefore not surprising that his thought shifts over time and collectively 
contains some ambiguity. One key area of ambiguity relates to the issue of whether myth 
shapes structure, or is shaped by it. This issues is highlighted in the neostructuralist period 
by scholars, such as Derrida, that who argue against an authoritative reading of the 
structure of a myth and instead posit a process of deconstruction that undermines the 
hegemonic structures and leaves open the possibility of replacing them through alternative 
readings, or mythic constructions (Derrida 1993). This idea is echoed in feminist 
mythopoetic readings of myth (see Dundes et al Part 4four, Section A, Chapter 2) that 
highlight (often using psychiatric symbol analysis) the underlying patriarchal structures of 
received myths and seek to replace them with narratives that contain disruptive, equalizsing 
structures (Fiorenza 2015). 
At a certain point this process becomes true mythopoiesis – moving beyond myth 
analysis into myth creation. In truth, many of the theories of myth that have been outlined 
above can be seen as forms of myth creation:, Muller is labelled a Solar Myth, by Littledale 
(1906: 279), and Eliade, in his memoirs, confesses that his analysis stems from the ‘pleasure 
of inventing, of dreaming, of thinking at all, relieved of the strictures of systematic thought’ 
(Rennie 1996: 3). From this perspective myth creation is tied to the creative act, including 
that of academic analysis, and as such an ongoing and unavoidable part of life today, as 
several of the chapters in the later stages of the book suggest. It is hoped that this book will 
help to inform that process by placing into debate with each other the contrasting and lively 
attempts to grapple with the issue of myth and, in so doing, add to the continuing 
development of our understanding of this at once widely known and yet seldom understood 
category of human expression. 
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